Admire the Design; Learn About the Designer

YOU have probably heard of the Italian painter and sculptor Michelangelo. Though you may never have seen the original of any of his masterpieces, you most likely agree with the art historian who called the Italian genius a “marvellous and incomparable artist.” Michelangelo’s talents cannot be denied. Who would try to separate appreciation for Michelangelo’s art from acknowledgment of him as an outstanding artist?
Now think of the mind-boggling complexity and diversity of life that thrives around us on earth. Appropriately, The New York Times quoted one professor of biological sciences as stating: “The physical marks of design are visible in aspects of biology.” He added: “Life overwhelms us with the appearance of design.” Is it intellectually honest to admire the design without acknowledging the designer?
The apostle Paul, a keen observer of things around him, spoke of those who “honoured and served the creature more than him who had created it.” (Romans 1:25, Darby) Affected by pervasive evolutionary ideas, some refuse or fail to recognize that design certainly points to a designer. But does the theory of evolution represent true science at its best? Note the conclusion that Christoph Schönborn, Catholic archbishop of Vienna, presented in The New York Times: “Any system of thought that denies or seeks to explain away the overwhelming evidence for design in biology is ideology, not science.”
The End of Science?
There are, however, those who feel that accepting the position that there is evidence of a Creator would “stifle research.” An article in the magazine New Scientist expressed such fears, asserting that “science as an open-ended pursuit would come to an end, halted by an impenetrable barrier labelled ‘the designer did it.’” Is that fear well-founded? Not at all. In fact, the opposite is true. Why?
To accept blind chance and subsequent evolution as the cause of our universe and life on earth would actually be to abandon any attempt to get a meaningful explanation. On the other hand, accepting that an intelligent Creator is behind what we see around us can lead us to investigate the nature and application of his intelligence manifested in the physical universe. Consider this: Knowing that Leonardo da Vinci painted the “Mona Lisa” has not stopped art historians from investigating his technique and the materials he used. Similarly, accepting that there is a Designer should not discourage us from inquiring into the details and complexity of his designs and creations.
Rather than stifling further research, the Bible encourages the search for answers to both scientific and spiritual questions. Ancient King David reflected on the physical makeup of his masterfully formed body. As a result, he said: “In a fear-inspiring way I am wonderfully made. Your works are wonderful, as my soul is very well aware.” (Psalm 139:14) In fact, the Bible presents the Creator as asking the patriarch Job: “Have you intelligently considered the broad spaces of the earth?” (Job 38:18) That certainly does not suggest any stifling of inquiry and investigation. On the contrary, the Master Designer here invited a study of his handiwork. Consider, too, the invitation penned by the prophet Isaiah that directs us to increase our understanding of the One responsible for the creation around us: “Raise your eyes high up and see. Who has created these things?” Indeed, Isaiah 40:26 then brings up a fact consistent with Einstein’s well-known formula E=mc2. That fact is that the universe was produced by a source of dynamic energy and power.
Granted, answers to questions regarding creation are not always readily available. In part, this is because our powers of understanding are limited and our grasp of the world in which we live is incomplete. Job understood this. He extolled the Creator, under whose direction our globe hangs on nothing visible in space and water-laden clouds are suspended above the earth. (Job 26:7-9) Yet, Job realized that such wonders ‘are but the fringes of the Creator’s ways.’ (Job 26:14) Job undoubtedly wanted to learn more about the world around him. And David admitted his limitations, writing: “Such knowledge is too wonderful for me. It is so high up that I cannot attain to it.”—Psalm 139:6.
Acceptance of the existence of a Creator does not hinder scientific progress. The quest for more comprehensive knowledge in both physical and spiritual matters is indeed open-ended and eternal. An ancient king noted for his broad knowledge humbly wrote: “He has put thoughts of the forever in man’s mind, yet man cannot understand the work God has done from the beginning to the end.”—Ecclesiastes 3:11, Holy Bible—New Life Version.
“God-of-the-Gaps”?
Some object that God is arbitrarily inserted “as an explanatory fix” wherever there is no provable scientific explanation. In other words, the claim is that such a divine Designer becomes the “God-of-the-gaps,” as if “God” were a magic word to use whenever men cannot figure things out. But what are the gaps referred to here? Are they merely small and insignificant gaps in our knowledge? No, they are real chasms of plausibility that exist in Darwinian evolution. They are fundamental breaches in aspects of biology that the theory of evolution has been incapable of bridging. In all fairness, evolutionists who rely on unsupported assertions effectively make the Darwinian theory their “God-of-the-gaps.”
The Creator presented in the Bible is no “God-of-the-gaps.” Rather, his activity covers all phases, aspects, and details of creation. The psalmist emphasized the all-encompassing creative activity of Jehovah: “You are the source of all life, and because of your light we see the light.” (Psalm 36:9, Today’s English Version) He is well described as the One “who made the heaven and the earth and the sea and all the things in them.” (Acts 4:24; 14:15; 17:24) For good reason, a first-century teacher wrote that God “created all things.”—Ephesians 3:9.
In addition, God established “the statutes of the heavens,” the physical laws that govern matter and energy, which laws scientists are still studying. (Job 38:33) His design is comprehensive and purposeful, achieving his objective to form the earth to be inhabited by a staggering diversity of living things.
Design and Common Sense
Finally, we need to consider the question of common sense. Commenting in general on the validity of various scientific theories, science writer John Horgan observed: “When the evidence is tentative, we should not be embarrassed to call on common sense for guidance.”
Does it really make sense to claim that life came about simply by chance or through blind forces? Despite the widespread popularity of the theory of evolution, many intelligent people, including scientists, are convinced that there is an intelligent Creator. A science professor notes that the general public “overwhelmingly, and sensibly, thinks that life was designed.” Why so? Most people will readily agree with the apostle Paul’s statement: “Every house is constructed by someone.” (Hebrews 3:4) Then Paul continues with the logical conclusion: “He that constructed all things is God.” From the Bible’s viewpoint, it simply does not make sense to acknowledge that a house needs a designer and builder and at the same time claim that a complicated cell accidentally sprang into existence.
The Bible makes an observation regarding those who reject the existence of a Designer and Creator: “The senseless one has said in his heart: ‘There is no Jehovah.’” (Psalm 14:1) Here, the psalmist reproves those who have yet to be convinced. A person might be guided by personal opinion rather than by pure objectivity. On the other hand, the wise, discerning person humbly acknowledges the existence of a Creator.—Isaiah 45:18.
For many thinking individuals, the evidence that supports a Supreme Designer is unmistakable

*** w07 8/15 p. 4 Admire the Design; Learn About the Designer ***
Admire the Design; Learn About the Designer

reaction to apology

Reaction
Socrates’ defense on the Apology by Plato raises up many points and teaches us many lessons. When we will read the Apology on the first part we would see that Socrates was saying that the manner on how we speak was not important but what was important was if what were saying was true, he was saying that the excellence of a jury lies on knowing if a defendant was saying the truth. Many of us would agree on that, but I would not agree in it, because in the first place what is ‘truth’, many of us would agree that truth is something agreed upon, but is it always the case? No, there are truths that are not agreed always. Many would agree that what is true is what is logical, and then if something is illogical it is false, if we use logic we will must how something is said, we would look upon the manner to determine if it’s true. Then the manner of how we speak is important because it determines if what we say is true.
Another point Socrates raise was about wisdom, he said that someone who thinks his wisdom was worthless was wise but someone who thinks he was wise was not (23b). Socrates assessed himself as a wise man because he thought his wisdom is worthless, if Socrates thinks he was wise then he was not truly, because as what he said someone who thinks he was wise was not. I think what he said was a little vague because he did not specify to which extent should a man think his wisdom was worthless. What he said was paradoxical because if someone thinks his wisdom was worthless he will begin to think he was wise then he thinks that his wisdom is worthy because he was wise.
On 28c of the Apology Socrates that a man should take account, not the risk of life and death, but if it is bad or good, I agree to what he said a man should not think if the consequences of his action could be death, but if it’s right or wrong.
On 28e Socrates said that when we are in what we think is best we must not fear its consequences. I think his wrong on that, because some of what we think was best was not best around us, and it will not be good. We must always think of what was also best for those around us because it was a good thing to do. In 28c Socrates said that what was important is if what we do was good or bad, but it’s not always that what was the best on us was good for everybody, we must always think of those around us, for what is good was not only what was good for us but what was good for everyone.
Socrates said in 30b of the apology that excellence is what makes wealth, but wealth does not bring men into excellence. I agree with what Socrates said, when one is wealthy it does not always mean that he is excellent, but when one is excellent there is a large probability that the one will be wealthy. One must not only seek wealth but one must also seek excellence.
In 35c it said that to teach and persuade the jury is better than to supplicate them. To supplicate them is to ask for, but to teach and persuade them, you tell them what they did not know. I think it is best for a jury to know everything so that they could give a just verdict. When one supplicates the jury could perjure because he could give an unjust verdict contrary to what he was sworn of.
In 36c Socrates said that one must care himself before caring for his belongings. I agree because if he cares for his belonging first he could not care himself and his belongings would be worthless.
In 38a it was said that it was the greatest good to discuss virtue and other things everyday because an unexamined life is not worth living. If we always think of things in our life we could examined our life and make it more worthy.
In 32a we were told that, one who fights for justice must lead a private life. I agree with it because when one fight for justice he would earn many enemies, and when he leads a public life, his name could be tarnished, but it will not be when he leads a private life.
35 a,b said that it is a disgrace when someone with virtue begs for mercy when he was going to be executed as if he will become an immortal if not. In 39 a,b Socrates said that any man should not contrive to avoid death. I agree with what he said, death is inevitable, even though someone may escape it there would be a time when death would overcome him.
Socrates said at 29b that “to fear death... is no other than to think someone wise when one is not, to think one knows what one does not know”. In 40d to41c Socrates believe and has hoped that death is a blessing because as what he has said, if it is a complete lack of perception then death could be equated to a single night, and if it is a relocation of the soul then it would be blessing. I personally believe that death is being completely unconscious and I disagree that death is a relocation of the soul, when one is dead his brain suddenly stops functioning.

note:if you have not read the apology of socrates a version by plato is available below

Solving Problems Using Ethical Theories


The Problem

My best friend and his girlfriend broke. The girlfriend spread rumors that my best friend slept with other people, but it is the other way around. However many people believe the girl and refuse to believe my best friend. The girl also smashed my best friend’s very expensive laptop and even refused to apologize and pay my best friend. The girl also sabotaged my best friends graduate school application; as a result, my best friend will no longer be admitted to the prestigious graduate school.
My best friend has been thinking for an act of revenge, it so happens that the girl’s ex-boyfriend is finishing his thesis and there is no other copy of his thesis. To deliver his vengeance my best friend decided to destroy the one and only thesis file.

The Argument

His ex-girlfriend treated him badly to the extent of sabotaging my best friends graduate school application, implying that that he would have a dim hope to reach his dreams. To revenge himself, my best friend must destroy the one and only thesis file of his ex-girlfriends’ ex-boyfriend.

The Moral Issue

The problem involved the moral issue of delivering vengeance, is delivering vengeance right? Or, wrong? Its like this, if my best friend destroys his ex-girlfriend’s ex boyfriend’s one and only thesis file, does the act he committed morally wrong. On the other hand, is it morally right? Is the act morally justified? Is it morally permissible even logically right?

The Theory

In solving the problems, people use several Ethical Theories. I personally use the Theory of Act Utilitarianism.
In Act Utilitarianism, we consider the consequences of the act, if it results to the greatest good for the greatest number of people, what is good in Utilitarianism is happiness, pleasure, or what is advantageous. We divide happiness in different levels. The first level is physical happiness, we are made happy by physical contentment or what is advantageous to our physical self, and for example in a feast, we are happy because we have a lot of food. Intellectual happiness is what is higher than physical happiness, since it is not only contentment or what is advantageous for our physical self but for our intellectual self, we put our intellectualism as higher than our physicality for example when we have a good grade. The highest kind of happiness is the spiritual happiness, in it we consider our spiritual self not only our physical and intellectual self, we consider what is our contentment and what is advantageous for our spiritual self.
What is right in Utilitarianism is maximizing what is good, which is happiness. The moral principle is to maximize what is act for the greatest good for the greatest number of people. In Act Utilitarianism, we consider the consequences of the act; will it hurt the greatest number of people? As opposed to Rule Utilitarianism, which consider the consequences of the rule we use to act; if the rule is applied would it bring the greatest good for the greatest number of people? While Kantian Ethics value Rationality, and the result when the act become a universal rule in determining the acceptability of an act; will it give rise to contradictions?
In Act Utilitarianism, we compare the consequences of the act and the not doing it. For example we have a moral problem like this, we badly need a high grade in a General Education course lets say English 1 but the problem we forgot to review for the exam, the situation gave us only two choices, to cheat, or not to cheat; in using Act Utilitarianism we compare the consequences of cheating and not cheating. In the process of comparing, we come up with some kind of a table tabulating the consequences of cheating juxtapose to the table with the list of the possible consequences of not cheating, it may look like this:
Cheat Not cheat
• Get high grade.
• If caught we build distrust in our teacher.
:
:
:
:
etc. • Get a low grade.
• Maintain the teachers’ trust.
:
:
:
:
:
etc.

In deciding we choose the act which will give us the greatest good for the greatest number of people, suppose we found out that not cheating will maintain our honor while cheating will only make us ashamed for ourselves, we decide not to cheat.
In using Act Utilitarianism we must know all the possible consequences or at least maximize the number of the possible consequences, there is no recommended number of consequences. In using Act Utilitarianism, we must understand that the consequences we know have a thin probability of happening.
The Argument
In solving the moral problem, we must consider the argument/s involved. My best friend’s argument is:
My best friend’s ex-girlfriend treated him badly to the extent of sabotaging his graduate school application, to avenge himself, my best friend must destroy the one and only thesis file of his ex-girlfriend’s ex-boyfriend.
Removing any unnecessary statements, we come up with this argument:
P1: If one is treated badly, the one must avenge himself.
P2: My best friend is treated badly.
_____________________________________________
Conclusion: Therefore my best friend must avenge himself.
When we are going to use symbolic logic we let B as a symbol when one is treated badly, A when one must avenge himself. Using the above argument and notations, we come up with a statement like this:
P1: If B then A
P2: B
____________
C: A
Or
P1: B A
P2: B
________
C: A
When we consider the above statement, we realize that the statement is in the form Modus Ponens that is considered as a valid argument.
We must also analyze the details of the argument, we define badly as something done in extreme, revenge as something done when someone is hurt to make the one who hurt realize what he have done. In inspecting the argument we found out that the argument do not contain any Fallacies of Relevance, Fallacies of Presumptions nor Fallacies of Ambiguity. We now clearly see that the argument is logically correct.




Right or Wrong

The argument is logically correct, but is it morally permissible? Now we will consider the consequences of destroying the one and only thesis file and the possible consequences of not doing it.
Consequences:
Destroy the one and only Thesis file. Do not destroy the one and only Thesis file.
• The ex-girlfriend’s ex- boyfriend will not graduate.
• Best friend will be happy.
• Ex-girlfriend’s ex-boyfriend will not be happy.
• Family of ex-girlfriend’s ex-boyfriend will not be happy.
• Adviser of ex-girlfriend’s ex boyfriend will not be happy. • Ex-girlfriend’s ex-boyfriend will be graduate.
• Best friend will not be happy.
• Ex-girlfriend’s ex-boyfriend will be happy.
• Family of ex-girlfriend’s ex-boyfriend will be happy.
• Adviser of ex-girlfriend’s ex boyfriend will be happy.

As we see in the table, the one we want to be hurt (the ex-girlfriend) will not be hurt since only the ex-girlfriend’s ex-boyfriend, his adviser, and his family will be hurt. In the problem the ex-girlfriend’s ex-boyfriend did not do anything wrong to my best friend, he must be left alone.


New Argument

My argument in not destroying the one and only Thesis file is:
Ex-girlfriend’s ex-boyfriend did not do anything wrong, when something did not do something bad we must not deliver vengeance, so my best friend must not revenge himself by destroying the one and only Thesis file of the ex-girlfriend’s ex-boyfriend.
When we put the argument in much simpler form we will come up with like this:
Ex-girlfriend’s ex-boyfriend did not do anything bad, when someone did not do something bad we must not deliver vengeance to him (the ex-girlfriend’s ex-boyfriend), so we must not deliver vengeance to him.
In the form of premises and conclusion:
P1: If someone did not do something bad, then we must not deliver vengeance to him.
P2:He (the ex-girlfriend’s ex boyfriend) did not do something bad.
_____________________________________________________
Conclusion: We must not deliver vengeance to him.
In symbolic form using the already stated notations:
P1: If not B then not A.
P2: Not B.
___________________
C: Not A.

Or
P1: NOT B NOT A
P2; NOT B
________________
C: NOT A
My argument is in the form Modus Ponens, and it did not contain any Informal Fallacies, since we have already considered that not destroying the one and only Thesis file is morally permissible. We can therefore conclude that the argument not to destroy the Thesis file, because the ex-girlfriend’s ex boyfriend did not do something bad to us, is logically correct and morally permissible.

The Advice
Since the ex-girlfriend’s ex-boyfriend did not cause something bad, he must be left alone.

On Apology

On Apology
(Comments on Plato’s Apology)

Apology

By Plato

Translated by Benjamin Jowett

Socrates' Defense

How you have felt, O men of Athens, at hearing the speeches of my accusers, I cannot tell; but I know that their persuasive words almost made me forget who I was - such was the effect of them; and yet they have hardly spoken a word of truth. But many as their falsehoods were, there was one of them which quite amazed me; - I mean when they told you to be upon your guard, and not to let yourselves be deceived by the force of my eloquence. They ought to have been ashamed of saying this, because they were sure to be detected as soon as I opened my lips and displayed my deficiency; they certainly did appear to be most shameless in saying this, unless by the force of eloquence they mean the force of truth; for then I do indeed admit that I am eloquent. But in how different a way from theirs! Well, as I was saying, they have hardly uttered a word, or not more than a word, of truth; but you shall hear from me the whole truth: not, however, delivered after their manner, in a set oration duly ornamented with words and phrases. No indeed! but I shall use the words and arguments which occur to me at the moment; for I am certain that this is right, and that at my time of life I ought not to be appearing before you, O men of Athens, in the character of a juvenile orator - let no one expect this of me. And I must beg of you to grant me one favor, which is this - If you hear me using the same words in my defence which I have been in the habit of using, and which most of you may have heard in the agora, and at the tables of the money-changers, or anywhere else, I would ask you not to be surprised at this, and not to interrupt me. For I am more than seventy years of age, and this is the first time that I have ever appeared in a court of law, and I am quite a stranger to the ways of the place; and therefore I would have you regard me as if I were really a stranger, whom you would excuse if he spoke in his native tongue, and after the fashion of his country; - that I think is not an unfair request. Never mind the manner, which may or may not be good; but think only of the justice of my cause, and give heed to that: let the judge decide justly and the speaker speak truly.

And first, I have to reply to the older charges and to my first accusers, and then I will go to the later ones. For I have had many accusers, who accused me of old, and their false charges have continued during many years; and I am more afraid of them than of Anytus and his associates, who are dangerous, too, in their own way. But far more dangerous are these, who began when you were children, and took possession of your minds with their falsehoods, telling of one Socrates, a wise man, who speculated about the heaven above, and searched into the earth beneath, and made the worse appear the better cause. These are the accusers whom I dread; for they are the circulators of this rumor, and their hearers are too apt to fancy that speculators of this sort do not believe in the gods. And they are many, and their charges against me are of ancient date, and they made them in days when you were impressible - in childhood, or perhaps in youth - and the cause when heard went by default, for there was none to answer. And, hardest of all, their names I do not know and cannot tell; unless in the chance of a comic poet. But the main body of these slanderers who from envy and malice have wrought upon you - and there are some of them who are convinced themselves, and impart their convictions to others - all these, I say, are most difficult to deal with; for I cannot have them up here, and examine them, and therefore I must simply fight with shadows in my own defence, and examine when there is no one who answers. I will ask you then to assume with me, as I was saying, that my opponents are of two kinds - one recent, the other ancient; and I hope that you will see the propriety of my answering the latter first, for these accusations you heard long before the others, and much oftener.

Well, then, I will make my defence, and I will endeavor in the short time which is allowed to do away with this evil opinion of me which you have held for such a long time; and I hope I may succeed, if this be well for you and me, and that my words may find favor with you. But I know that to accomplish this is not easy - I quite see the nature of the task. Let the event be as God wills: in obedience to the law I make my defence.

I will begin at the beginning, and ask what the accusation is which has given rise to this slander of me, and which has encouraged Meletus to proceed against me. What do the slanderers say? They shall be my prosecutors, and I will sum up their words in an affidavit. "Socrates is an evil-doer, and a curious person, who searches into things under the earth and in heaven, and he makes the worse appear the better cause; and he teaches the aforesaid doctrines to others." That is the nature of the accusation, and that is what you have seen yourselves in the comedy of Aristophanes; who has introduced a man whom he calls Socrates, going about and saying that he can walk in the air, and talking a deal of nonsense concerning matters of which I do not pretend to know either much or little - not that I mean to say anything disparaging of anyone who is a student of natural philosophy. I should be very sorry if Meletus could lay that to my charge. But the simple truth is, O Athenians, that I have nothing to do with these studies. Very many of those here present are witnesses to the truth of this, and to them I appeal. Speak then, you who have heard me, and tell your neighbors whether any of you have ever known me hold forth in few words or in many upon matters of this sort. ... You hear their answer. And from what they say of this you will be able to judge of the truth of the rest.

As little foundation is there for the report that I am a teacher, and take money; that is no more true than the other. Although, if a man is able to teach, I honor him for being paid. There is Gorgias of Leontium, and Prodicus of Ceos, and Hippias of Elis, who go the round of the cities, and are able to persuade the young men to leave their own citizens, by whom they might be taught for nothing, and come to them, whom they not only pay, but are thankful if they may be allowed to pay them. There is actually a Parian philosopher residing in Athens, of whom I have heard; and I came to hear of him in this way: - I met a man who has spent a world of money on the Sophists, Callias the son of Hipponicus, and knowing that he had sons, I asked him: "Callias," I said, "if your two sons were foals or calves, there would be no difficulty in finding someone to put over them; we should hire a trainer of horses or a farmer probably who would improve and perfect them in their own proper virtue and excellence; but as they are human beings, whom are you thinking of placing over them? Is there anyone who understands human and political virtue? You must have thought about this as you have sons; is there anyone?" "There is," he said. "Who is he?" said I, "and of what country? and what does he charge?" "Evenus the Parian," he replied; "he is the man, and his charge is five minae." Happy is Evenus, I said to myself, if he really has this wisdom, and teaches at such a modest charge. Had I the same, I should have been very proud and conceited; but the truth is that I have no knowledge of the kind.

I dare say, Athenians, that someone among you will reply, "Why is this, Socrates, and what is the origin of these accusations of you: for there must have been something strange which you have been doing? All this great fame and talk about you would never have arisen if you had been like other men: tell us, then, why this is, as we should be sorry to judge hastily of you." Now I regard this as a fair challenge, and I will endeavor to explain to you the origin of this name of "wise," and of this evil fame. Please to attend then. And although some of you may think I am joking, I declare that I will tell you the entire truth. Men of Athens, this reputation of mine has come of a certain sort of wisdom which I possess. If you ask me what kind of wisdom, I reply, such wisdom as is attainable by man, for to that extent I am inclined to believe that I am wise; whereas the persons of whom I was speaking have a superhuman wisdom, which I may fail to describe, because I have it not myself; and he who says that I have, speaks falsely, and is taking away my character. And here, O men of Athens, I must beg you not to interrupt me, even if I seem to say something extravagant. For the word which I will speak is not mine. I will refer you to a witness who is worthy of credit, and will tell you about my wisdom - whether I have any, and of what sort - and that witness shall be the god of Delphi. You must have known Chaerephon; he was early a friend of mine, and also a friend of yours, for he shared in the exile of the people, and returned with you. Well, Chaerephon, as you know, was very impetuous in all his doings, and he went to Delphi and boldly asked the oracle to tell him whether - as I was saying, I must beg you not to interrupt - he asked the oracle to tell him whether there was anyone wiser than I was, and the Pythian prophetess answered that there was no man wiser. Chaerephon is dead himself, but his brother, who is in court, will confirm the truth of this story.

Why do I mention this? Because I am going to explain to you why I have such an evil name. When I heard the answer, I said to myself, What can the god mean? and what is the interpretation of this riddle? for I know that I have no wisdom, small or great. What can he mean when he says that I am the wisest of men? And yet he is a god and cannot lie; that would be against his nature. After a long consideration, I at last thought of a method of trying the question. I reflected that if I could only find a man wiser than myself, then I might go to the god with a refutation in my hand. I should say to him, "Here is a man who is wiser than I am; but you said that I was the wisest." Accordingly I went to one who had the reputation of wisdom, and observed to him - his name I need not mention; he was a politician whom I selected for examination - and the result was as follows: When I began to talk with him, I could not help thinking that he was not really wise, although he was thought wise by many, and wiser still by himself; and I went and tried to explain to him that he thought himself wise, but was not really wise; and the consequence was that he hated me, and his enmity was shared by several who were present and heard me. So I left him, saying to myself, as I went away: Well, although I do not suppose that either of us knows anything really beautiful and good, I am better off than he is - for he knows nothing, and thinks that he knows. I neither know nor think that I know. In this latter particular, then, I seem to have slightly the advantage of him. Then I went to another, who had still higher philosophical pretensions, and my conclusion was exactly the same. I made another enemy of him, and of many others besides him.

After this I went to one man after another, being not unconscious of the enmity which I provoked, and I lamented and feared this: but necessity was laid upon me - the word of God, I thought, ought to be considered first. And I said to myself, Go I must to all who appear to know, and find out the meaning of the oracle. And I swear to you, Athenians, by the dog I swear! - for I must tell you the truth - the result of my mission was just this: I found that the men most in repute were all but the most foolish; and that some inferior men were really wiser and better. I will tell you the tale of my wanderings and of the "Herculean" labors, as I may call them, which I endured only to find at last the oracle irrefutable. When I left the politicians, I went to the poets; tragic, dithyrambic, and all sorts. And there, I said to myself, you will be detected; now you will find out that you are more ignorant than they are. Accordingly, I took them some of the most elaborate passages in their own writings, and asked what was the meaning of them - thinking that they would teach me something. Will you believe me? I am almost ashamed to speak of this, but still I must say that there is hardly a person present who would not have talked better about their poetry than they did themselves. That showed me in an instant that not by wisdom do poets write poetry, but by a sort of genius and inspiration; they are like diviners or soothsayers who also say many fine things, but do not understand the meaning of them. And the poets appeared to me to be much in the same case; and I further observed that upon the strength of their poetry they believed themselves to be the wisest of men in other things in which they were not wise. So I departed, conceiving myself to be superior to them for the same reason that I was superior to the politicians.

At last I went to the artisans, for I was conscious that I knew nothing at all, as I may say, and I was sure that they knew many fine things; and in this I was not mistaken, for they did know many things of which I was ignorant, and in this they certainly were wiser than I was. But I observed that even the good artisans fell into the same error as the poets; because they were good workmen they thought that they also knew all sorts of high matters, and this defect in them overshadowed their wisdom - therefore I asked myself on behalf of the oracle, whether I would like to be as I was, neither having their knowledge nor their ignorance, or like them in both; and I made answer to myself and the oracle that I was better off as I was.

This investigation has led to my having many enemies of the worst and most dangerous kind, and has given occasion also to many calumnies, and I am called wise, for my hearers always imagine that I myself possess the wisdom which I find wanting in others: but the truth is, O men of Athens, that God only is wise; and in this oracle he means to say that the wisdom of men is little or nothing; he is not speaking of Socrates, he is only using my name as an illustration, as if he said, He, O men, is the wisest, who, like Socrates, knows that his wisdom is in truth worth nothing. And so I go my way, obedient to the god, and make inquisition into the wisdom of anyone, whether citizen or stranger, who appears to be wise; and if he is not wise, then in vindication of the oracle I show him that he is not wise; and this occupation quite absorbs me, and I have no time to give either to any public matter of interest or to any concern of my own, but I am in utter poverty by reason of my devotion to the god.

There is another thing: - young men of the richer classes, who have not much to do, come about me of their own accord; they like to hear the pretenders examined, and they often imitate me, and examine others themselves; there are plenty of persons, as they soon enough discover, who think that they know something, but really know little or nothing: and then those who are examined by them instead of being angry with themselves are angry with me: This confounded Socrates, they say; this villainous misleader of youth! - and then if somebody asks them, Why, what evil does he practise or teach? they do not know, and cannot tell; but in order that they may not appear to be at a loss, they repeat the ready-made charges which are used against all philosophers about teaching things up in the clouds and under the earth, and having no gods, and making the worse appear the better cause; for they do not like to confess that their pretence of knowledge has been detected - which is the truth: and as they are numerous and ambitious and energetic, and are all in battle array and have persuasive tongues, they have filled your ears with their loud and inveterate calumnies. And this is the reason why my three accusers, Meletus and Anytus and Lycon, have set upon me; Meletus, who has a quarrel with me on behalf of the poets; Anytus, on behalf of the craftsmen; Lycon, on behalf of the rhetoricians: and as I said at the beginning, I cannot expect to get rid of this mass of calumny all in a moment. And this, O men of Athens, is the truth and the whole truth; I have concealed nothing, I have dissembled nothing. And yet I know that this plainness of speech makes them hate me, and what is their hatred but a proof that I am speaking the truth? - this is the occasion and reason of their slander of me, as you will find out either in this or in any future inquiry.

I have said enough in my defence against the first class of my accusers; I turn to the second class, who are headed by Meletus, that good and patriotic man, as he calls himself. And now I will try to defend myself against them: these new accusers must also have their affidavit read. What do they say? Something of this sort: - That Socrates is a doer of evil, and corrupter of the youth, and he does not believe in the gods of the state, and has other new divinities of his own. That is the sort of charge; and now let us examine the particular counts. He says that I am a doer of evil, who corrupt the youth; but I say, O men of Athens, that Meletus is a doer of evil, and the evil is that he makes a joke of a serious matter, and is too ready at bringing other men to trial from a pretended zeal and interest about matters in which he really never had the smallest interest. And the truth of this I will endeavor to prove.

Come hither, Meletus, and let me ask a question of you. You think a great deal about the improvement of youth?

Yes, I do.

Tell the judges, then, who is their improver; for you must know, as you have taken the pains to discover their corrupter, and are citing and accusing me before them. Speak, then, and tell the judges who their improver is. Observe, Meletus, that you are silent, and have nothing to say. But is not this rather disgraceful, and a very considerable proof of what I was saying, that you have no interest in the matter? Speak up, friend, and tell us who their improver is.

The laws.

But that, my good sir, is not my meaning. I want to know who the person is, who, in the first place, knows the laws.

The judges, Socrates, who are present in court.

What do you mean to say, Meletus, that they are able to instruct and improve youth?

Certainly they are.

What, all of them, or some only and not others?

All of them.

By the goddess Here, that is good news! There are plenty of improvers, then. And what do you say of the audience, - do they improve them?

Yes, they do.

And the senators?

Yes, the senators improve them.

But perhaps the members of the citizen assembly corrupt them? - or do they too improve them?

They improve them.

Then every Athenian improves and elevates them; all with the exception of myself; and I alone am their corrupter? Is that what you affirm?

That is what I stoutly affirm.

I am very unfortunate if that is true. But suppose I ask you a question: Would you say that this also holds true in the case of horses? Does one man do them harm and all the world good? Is not the exact opposite of this true? One man is able to do them good, or at least not many; - the trainer of horses, that is to say, does them good, and others who have to do with them rather injure them? Is not that true, Meletus, of horses, or any other animals? Yes, certainly. Whether you and Anytus say yes or no, that is no matter. Happy indeed would be the condition of youth if they had one corrupter only, and all the rest of the world were their improvers. And you, Meletus, have sufficiently shown that you never had a thought about the young: your carelessness is seen in your not caring about matters spoken of in this very indictment.

And now, Meletus, I must ask you another question: Which is better, to live among bad citizens, or among good ones? Answer, friend, I say; for that is a question which may be easily answered. Do not the good do their neighbors good, and the bad do them evil?

Certainly.

And is there anyone who would rather be injured than benefited by those who live with him? Answer, my good friend; the law requires you to answer - does anyone like to be injured?

Certainly not.

And when you accuse me of corrupting and deteriorating the youth, do you allege that I corrupt them intentionally or unintentionally?

Intentionally, I say.

But you have just admitted that the good do their neighbors good, and the evil do them evil. Now is that a truth which your superior wisdom has recognized thus early in life, and am I, at my age, in such darkness and ignorance as not to know that if a man with whom I have to live is corrupted by me, I am very likely to be harmed by him, and yet I corrupt him, and intentionally, too; - that is what you are saying, and of that you will never persuade me or any other human being. But either I do not corrupt them, or I corrupt them unintentionally, so that on either view of the case you lie. If my offence is unintentional, the law has no cognizance of unintentional offences: you ought to have taken me privately, and warned and admonished me; for if I had been better advised, I should have left off doing what I only did unintentionally - no doubt I should; whereas you hated to converse with me or teach me, but you indicted me in this court, which is a place not of instruction, but of punishment.

I have shown, Athenians, as I was saying, that Meletus has no care at all, great or small, about the matter. But still I should like to know, Meletus, in what I am affirmed to corrupt the young. I suppose you mean, as I infer from your indictment, that I teach them not to acknowledge the gods which the state acknowledges, but some other new divinities or spiritual agencies in their stead. These are the lessons which corrupt the youth, as you say.

Yes, that I say emphatically.

Then, by the gods, Meletus, of whom we are speaking, tell me and the court, in somewhat plainer terms, what you mean! for I do not as yet understand whether you affirm that I teach others to acknowledge some gods, and therefore do believe in gods and am not an entire atheist - this you do not lay to my charge; but only that they are not the same gods which the city recognizes - the charge is that they are different gods. Or, do you mean to say that I am an atheist simply, and a teacher of atheism?

I mean the latter - that you are a complete atheist.

That is an extraordinary statement, Meletus. Why do you say that? Do you mean that I do not believe in the godhead of the sun or moon, which is the common creed of all men?

I assure you, judges, that he does not believe in them; for he says that the sun is stone, and the moon earth.

Friend Meletus, you think that you are accusing Anaxagoras; and you have but a bad opinion of the judges, if you fancy them ignorant to such a degree as not to know that those doctrines are found in the books of Anaxagoras the Clazomenian, who is full of them. And these are the doctrines which the youth are said to learn of Socrates, when there are not unfrequently exhibitions of them at the theatre (price of admission one drachma at the most); and they might cheaply purchase them, and laugh at Socrates if he pretends to father such eccentricities. And so, Meletus, you really think that I do not believe in any god?

I swear by Zeus that you believe absolutely in none at all.

You are a liar, Meletus, not believed even by yourself. For I cannot help thinking, O men of Athens, that Meletus is reckless and impudent, and that he has written this indictment in a spirit of mere wantonness and youthful bravado. Has he not compounded a riddle, thinking to try me? He said to himself: - I shall see whether this wise Socrates will discover my ingenious contradiction, or whether I shall be able to deceive him and the rest of them. For he certainly does appear to me to contradict himself in the indictment as much as if he said that Socrates is guilty of not believing in the gods, and yet of believing in them - but this surely is a piece of fun.

I should like you, O men of Athens, to join me in examining what I conceive to be his inconsistency; and do you, Meletus, answer. And I must remind you that you are not to interrupt me if I speak in my accustomed manner.

Did ever man, Meletus, believe in the existence of human things, and not of human beings? ... I wish, men of Athens, that he would answer, and not be always trying to get up an interruption. Did ever any man believe in horsemanship, and not in horses? or in flute-playing, and not in flute-players? No, my friend; I will answer to you and to the court, as you refuse to answer for yourself. There is no man who ever did. But now please to answer the next question: Can a man believe in spiritual and divine agencies, and not in spirits or demigods?

He cannot.

I am glad that I have extracted that answer, by the assistance of the court; nevertheless you swear in the indictment that I teach and believe in divine or spiritual agencies (new or old, no matter for that); at any rate, I believe in spiritual agencies, as you say and swear in the affidavit; but if I believe in divine beings, I must believe in spirits or demigods; - is not that true? Yes, that is true, for I may assume that your silence gives assent to that. Now what are spirits or demigods? are they not either gods or the sons of gods? Is that true?

Yes, that is true.

But this is just the ingenious riddle of which I was speaking: the demigods or spirits are gods, and you say first that I don't believe in gods, and then again that I do believe in gods; that is, if I believe in demigods. For if the demigods are the illegitimate sons of gods, whether by the Nymphs or by any other mothers, as is thought, that, as all men will allow, necessarily implies the existence of their parents. You might as well affirm the existence of mules, and deny that of horses and asses. Such nonsense, Meletus, could only have been intended by you as a trial of me. You have put this into the indictment because you had nothing real of which to accuse me. But no one who has a particle of understanding will ever be convinced by you that the same man can believe in divine and superhuman things, and yet not believe that there are gods and demigods and heroes.

I have said enough in answer to the charge of Meletus: any elaborate defence is unnecessary; but as I was saying before, I certainly have many enemies, and this is what will be my destruction if I am destroyed; of that I am certain; - not Meletus, nor yet Anytus, but the envy and detraction of the world, which has been the death of many good men, and will probably be the death of many more; there is no danger of my being the last of them.

Someone will say: And are you not ashamed, Socrates, of a course of life which is likely to bring you to an untimely end? To him I may fairly answer: There you are mistaken: a man who is good for anything ought not to calculate the chance of living or dying; he ought only to consider whether in doing anything he is doing right or wrong - acting the part of a good man or of a bad. Whereas, according to your view, the heroes who fell at Troy were not good for much, and the son of Thetis above all, who altogether despised danger in comparison with disgrace; and when his goddess mother said to him, in his eagerness to slay Hector, that if he avenged his companion Patroclus, and slew Hector, he would die himself - "Fate," as she said, "waits upon you next after Hector"; he, hearing this, utterly despised danger and death, and instead of fearing them, feared rather to live in dishonor, and not to avenge his friend. "Let me die next," he replies, "and be avenged of my enemy, rather than abide here by the beaked ships, a scorn and a burden of the earth." Had Achilles any thought of death and danger? For wherever a man's place is, whether the place which he has chosen or that in which he has been placed by a commander, there he ought to remain in the hour of danger; he should not think of death or of anything, but of disgrace. And this, O men of Athens, is a true saying.

Strange, indeed, would be my conduct, O men of Athens, if I who, when I was ordered by the generals whom you chose to command me at Potidaea and Amphipolis and Delium, remained where they placed me, like any other man, facing death; if, I say, now, when, as I conceive and imagine, God orders me to fulfil the philosopher's mission of searching into myself and other men, I were to desert my post through fear of death, or any other fear; that would indeed be strange, and I might justly be arraigned in court for denying the existence of the gods, if I disobeyed the oracle because I was afraid of death: then I should be fancying that I was wise when I was not wise. For this fear of death is indeed the pretence of wisdom, and not real wisdom, being the appearance of knowing the unknown; since no one knows whether death, which they in their fear apprehend to be the greatest evil, may not be the greatest good. Is there not here conceit of knowledge, which is a disgraceful sort of ignorance? And this is the point in which, as I think, I am superior to men in general, and in which I might perhaps fancy myself wiser than other men, - that whereas I know but little of the world below, I do not suppose that I know: but I do know that injustice and disobedience to a better, whether God or man, is evil and dishonorable, and I will never fear or avoid a possible good rather than a certain evil. And therefore if you let me go now, and reject the counsels of Anytus, who said that if I were not put to death I ought not to have been prosecuted, and that if I escape now, your sons will all be utterly ruined by listening to my words - if you say to me, Socrates, this time we will not mind Anytus, and will let you off, but upon one condition, that are to inquire and speculate in this way any more, and that if you are caught doing this again you shall die; - if this was the condition on which you let me go, I should reply: Men of Athens, I honor and love you; but I shall obey God rather than you, and while I have life and strength I shall never cease from the practice and teaching of philosophy, exhorting anyone whom I meet after my manner, and convincing him, saying: O my friend, why do you who are a citizen of the great and mighty and wise city of Athens, care so much about laying up the greatest amount of money and honor and reputation, and so little about wisdom and truth and the greatest improvement of the soul, which you never regard or heed at all? Are you not ashamed of this? And if the person with whom I am arguing says: Yes, but I do care; I do not depart or let him go at once; I interrogate and examine and cross-examine him, and if I think that he has no virtue, but only says that he has, I reproach him with undervaluing the greater, and overvaluing the less. And this I should say to everyone whom I meet, young and old, citizen and alien, but especially to the citizens, inasmuch as they are my brethren. For this is the command of God, as I would have you know; and I believe that to this day no greater good has ever happened in the state than my service to the God. For I do nothing but go about persuading you all, old and young alike, not to take thought for your persons and your properties, but first and chiefly to care about the greatest improvement of the soul. I tell you that virtue is not given by money, but that from virtue come money and every other good of man, public as well as private. This is my teaching, and if this is the doctrine which corrupts the youth, my influence is ruinous indeed. But if anyone says that this is not my teaching, he is speaking an untruth. Wherefore, O men of Athens, I say to you, do as Anytus bids or not as Anytus bids, and either acquit me or not; but whatever you do, know that I shall never alter my ways, not even if I have to die many times.

Men of Athens, do not interrupt, but hear me; there was an agreement between us that you should hear me out. And I think that what I am going to say will do you good: for I have something more to say, at which you may be inclined to cry out; but I beg that you will not do this. I would have you know that, if you kill such a one as I am, you will injure yourselves more than you will injure me. Meletus and Anytus will not injure me: they cannot; for it is not in the nature of things that a bad man should injure a better than himself. I do not deny that he may, perhaps, kill him, or drive him into exile, or deprive him of civil rights; and he may imagine, and others may imagine, that he is doing him a great injury: but in that I do not agree with him; for the evil of doing as Anytus is doing - of unjustly taking away another man's life - is greater far. And now, Athenians, I am not going to argue for my own sake, as you may think, but for yours, that you may not sin against the God, or lightly reject his boon by condemning me. For if you kill me you will not easily find another like me, who, if I may use such a ludicrous figure of speech, am a sort of gadfly, given to the state by the God; and the state is like a great and noble steed who is tardy in his motions owing to his very size, and requires to be stirred into life. I am that gadfly which God has given the state and all day long and in all places am always fastening upon you, arousing and persuading and reproaching you. And as you will not easily find another like me, I would advise you to spare me. I dare say that you may feel irritated at being suddenly awakened when you are caught napping; and you may think that if you were to strike me dead, as Anytus advises, which you easily might, then you would sleep on for the remainder of your lives, unless God in his care of you gives you another gadfly. And that I am given to you by God is proved by this: - that if I had been like other men, I should not have neglected all my own concerns, or patiently seen the neglect of them during all these years, and have been doing yours, coming to you individually, like a father or elder brother, exhorting you to regard virtue; this I say, would not be like human nature. And had I gained anything, or if my exhortations had been paid, there would have been some sense in that: but now, as you will perceive, not even the impudence of my accusers dares to say that I have ever exacted or sought pay of anyone; they have no witness of that. And I have a witness of the truth of what I say; my poverty is a sufficient witness.

Someone may wonder why I go about in private, giving advice and busying myself with the concerns of others, but do not venture to come forward in public and advise the state. I will tell you the reason of this. You have often heard me speak of an oracle or sign which comes to me, and is the divinity which Meletus ridicules in the indictment. This sign I have had ever since I was a child. The sign is a voice which comes to me and always forbids me to do something which I am going to do, but never commands me to do anything, and this is what stands in the way of my being a politician. And rightly, as I think. For I am certain, O men of Athens, that if I had engaged in politics, I should have perished long ago and done no good either to you or to myself. And don't be offended at my telling you the truth: for the truth is that no man who goes to war with you or any other multitude, honestly struggling against the commission of unrighteousness and wrong in the state, will save his life; he who will really fight for the right, if he would live even for a little while, must have a private station and not a public one.

I can give you as proofs of this, not words only, but deeds, which you value more than words. Let me tell you a passage of my own life, which will prove to you that I should never have yielded to injustice from any fear of death, and that if I had not yielded I should have died at once. I will tell you a story - tasteless, perhaps, and commonplace, but nevertheless true. The only office of state which I ever held, O men of Athens, was that of senator; the tribe Antiochis, which is my tribe, had the presidency at the trial of the generals who had not taken up the bodies of the slain after the battle of Arginusae; and you proposed to try them all together, which was illegal, as you all thought afterwards; but at the time I was the only one of the Prytanes who was opposed to the illegality, and I gave my vote against you; and when the orators threatened to impeach and arrest me, and have me taken away, and you called and shouted, I made up my mind that I would run the risk, having law and justice with me, rather than take part in your injustice because I feared imprisonment and death. This happened in the days of the democracy. But when the oligarchy of the Thirty was in power, they sent for me and four others into the rotunda, and bade us bring Leon the Salaminian from Salamis, as they wanted to execute him. This was a specimen of the sort of commands which they were always giving with the view of implicating as many as possible in their crimes; and then I showed, not in words only, but in deed, that, if I may be allowed to use such an expression, I cared not a straw for death, and that my only fear was the fear of doing an unrighteous or unholy thing. For the strong arm of that oppressive power did not frighten me into doing wrong; and when we came out of the rotunda the other four went to Salamis and fetched Leon, but I went quietly home. For which I might have lost my life, had not the power of the Thirty shortly afterwards come to an end. And to this many will witness.

Now do you really imagine that I could have survived all these years, if I had led a public life, supposing that like a good man I had always supported the right and had made justice, as I ought, the first thing? No, indeed, men of Athens, neither I nor any other. But I have been always the same in all my actions, public as well as private, and never have I yielded any base compliance to those who are slanderously termed my disciples or to any other. For the truth is that I have no regular disciples: but if anyone likes to come and hear me while I am pursuing my mission, whether he be young or old, he may freely come. Nor do I converse with those who pay only, and not with those who do not pay; but anyone, whether he be rich or poor, may ask and answer me and listen to my words; and whether he turns out to be a bad man or a good one, that cannot be justly laid to my charge, as I never taught him anything. And if anyone says that he has ever learned or heard anything from me in private which all the world has not heard, I should like you to know that he is speaking an untruth.

But I shall be asked, Why do people delight in continually conversing with you? I have told you already, Athenians, the whole truth about this: they like to hear the cross-examination of the pretenders to wisdom; there is amusement in this. And this is a duty which the God has imposed upon me, as I am assured by oracles, visions, and in every sort of way in which the will of divine power was ever signified to anyone. This is true, O Athenians; or, if not true, would be soon refuted. For if I am really corrupting the youth, and have corrupted some of them already, those of them who have grown up and have become sensible that I gave them bad advice in the days of their youth should come forward as accusers and take their revenge; and if they do not like to come themselves, some of their relatives, fathers, brothers, or other kinsmen, should say what evil their families suffered at my hands. Now is their time. Many of them I see in the court. There is Crito, who is of the same age and of the same deme with myself; and there is Critobulus his son, whom I also see. Then again there is Lysanias of Sphettus, who is the father of Aeschines - he is present; and also there is Antiphon of Cephisus, who is the father of Epignes; and there are the brothers of several who have associated with me. There is Nicostratus the son of Theosdotides, and the brother of Theodotus (now Theodotus himself is dead, and therefore he, at any rate, will not seek to stop him); and there is Paralus the son of Demodocus, who had a brother Theages; and Adeimantus the son of Ariston, whose brother Plato is present; and Aeantodorus, who is the brother of Apollodorus, whom I also see. I might mention a great many others, any of whom Meletus should have produced as witnesses in the course of his speech; and let him still produce them, if he has forgotten - I will make way for him. And let him say, if he has any testimony of the sort which he can produce. Nay, Athenians, the very opposite is the truth. For all these are ready to witness on behalf of the corrupter, of the destroyer of their kindred, as Meletus and Anytus call me; not the corrupted youth only - there might have been a motive for that - but their uncorrupted elder relatives. Why should they too support me with their testimony? Why, indeed, except for the sake of truth and justice, and because they know that I am speaking the truth, and that Meletus is lying.

Well, Athenians, this and the like of this is nearly all the defence which I have to offer. Yet a word more. Perhaps there may be someone who is offended at me, when he calls to mind how he himself, on a similar or even a less serious occasion, had recourse to prayers and supplications with many tears, and how he produced his children in court, which was a moving spectacle, together with a posse of his relations and friends; whereas I, who am probably in danger of my life, will do none of these things. Perhaps this may come into his mind, and he may be set against me, and vote in anger because he is displeased at this. Now if there be such a person among you, which I am far from affirming, I may fairly reply to him: My friend, I am a man, and like other men, a creature of flesh and blood, and not of wood or stone, as Homer says; and I have a family, yes, and sons. O Athenians, three in number, one of whom is growing up, and the two others are still young; and yet I will not bring any of them hither in order to petition you for an acquittal. And why not? Not from any self-will or disregard of you. Whether I am or am not afraid of death is another question, of which I will not now speak. But my reason simply is that I feel such conduct to be discreditable to myself, and you, and the whole state. One who has reached my years, and who has a name for wisdom, whether deserved or not, ought not to debase himself. At any rate, the world has decided that Socrates is in some way superior to other men. And if those among you who are said to be superior in wisdom and courage, and any other virtue, demean themselves in this way, how shameful is their conduct! I have seen men of reputation, when they have been condemned, behaving in the strangest manner: they seemed to fancy that they were going to suffer something dreadful if they died, and that they could be immortal if you only allowed them to live; and I think that they were a dishonor to the state, and that any stranger coming in would say of them that the most eminent men of Athens, to whom the Athenians themselves give honor and command, are no better than women. And I say that these things ought not to be done by those of us who are of reputation; and if they are done, you ought not to permit them; you ought rather to show that you are more inclined to condemn, not the man who is quiet, but the man who gets up a doleful scene, and makes the city ridiculous.

But, setting aside the question of dishonor, there seems to be something wrong in petitioning a judge, and thus procuring an acquittal instead of informing and convincing him. For his duty is, not to make a present of justice, but to give judgment; and he has sworn that he will judge according to the laws, and not according to his own good pleasure; and neither he nor we should get into the habit of perjuring ourselves - there can be no piety in that. Do not then require me to do what I consider dishonorable and impious and wrong, especially now, when I am being tried for impiety on the indictment of Meletus. For if, O men of Athens, by force of persuasion and entreaty, I could overpower your oaths, then I should be teaching you to believe that there are no gods, and convict myself, in my own defence, of not believing in them. But that is not the case; for I do believe that there are gods, and in a far higher sense than that in which any of my accusers believe in them. And to you and to God I commit my cause, to be determined by you as is best for you and me.


The jury finds Socrates guilty.

Socrates' Proposal for his Sentence

There are many reasons why I am not grieved, O men of Athens, at the vote of condemnation. I expected it, and am only surprised that the votes are so nearly equal; for I had thought that the majority against me would have been far larger; but now, had thirty votes gone over to the other side, I should have been acquitted. And I may say that I have escaped Meletus. And I may say more; for without the assistance of Anytus and Lycon, he would not have had a fifth part of the votes, as the law requires, in which case he would have incurred a fine of a thousand drachmae, as is evident.

And so he proposes death as the penalty. And what shall I propose on my part, O men of Athens? Clearly that which is my due. And what is that which I ought to pay or to receive? What shall be done to the man who has never had the wit to be idle during his whole life; but has been careless of what the many care about - wealth, and family interests, and military offices, and speaking in the assembly, and magistracies, and plots, and parties. Reflecting that I was really too honest a man to follow in this way and live, I did not go where I could do no good to you or to myself; but where I could do the greatest good privately to everyone of you, thither I went, and sought to persuade every man among you that he must look to himself, and seek virtue and wisdom before he looks to his private interests, and look to the state before he looks to the interests of the state; and that this should be the order which he observes in all his actions. What shall be done to such a one? Doubtless some good thing, O men of Athens, if he has his reward; and the good should be of a kind suitable to him. What would be a reward suitable to a poor man who is your benefactor, who desires leisure that he may instruct you? There can be no more fitting reward than maintenance in the Prytaneum, O men of Athens, a reward which he deserves far more than the citizen who has won the prize at Olympia in the horse or chariot race, whether the chariots were drawn by two horses or by many. For I am in want, and he has enough; and he only gives you the appearance of happiness, and I give you the reality. And if I am to estimate the penalty justly, I say that maintenance in the Prytaneum is the just return.

Perhaps you may think that I am braving you in saying this, as in what I said before about the tears and prayers. But that is not the case. I speak rather because I am convinced that I never intentionally wronged anyone, although I cannot convince you of that - for we have had a short conversation only; but if there were a law at Athens, such as there is in other cities, that a capital cause should not be decided in one day, then I believe that I should have convinced you; but now the time is too short. I cannot in a moment refute great slanders; and, as I am convinced that I never wronged another, I will assuredly not wrong myself. I will not say of myself that I deserve any evil, or propose any penalty. Why should I? Because I am afraid of the penalty of death which Meletus proposes? When I do not know whether death is a good or an evil, why should I propose a penalty which would certainly be an evil? Shall I say imprisonment? And why should I live in prison, and be the slave of the magistrates of the year - of the Eleven? Or shall the penalty be a fine, and imprisonment until the fine is paid? There is the same objection. I should have to lie in prison, for money I have none, and I cannot pay. And if I say exile (and this may possibly be the penalty which you will affix), I must indeed be blinded by the love of life if I were to consider that when you, who are my own citizens, cannot endure my discourses and words, and have found them so grievous and odious that you would fain have done with them, others are likely to endure me. No, indeed, men of Athens, that is not very likely. And what a life should I lead, at my age, wandering from city to city, living in ever-changing exile, and always being driven out! For I am quite sure that into whatever place I go, as here so also there, the young men will come to me; and if I drive them away, their elders will drive me out at their desire: and if I let them come, their fathers and friends will drive me out for their sakes.

Someone will say: Yes, Socrates, but cannot you hold your tongue, and then you may go into a foreign city, and no one will interfere with you? Now I have great difficulty in making you understand my answer to this. For if I tell you that this would be a disobedience to a divine command, and therefore that I cannot hold my tongue, you will not believe that I am serious; and if I say again that the greatest good of man is daily to converse about virtue, and all that concerning which you hear me examining myself and others, and that the life which is unexamined is not worth living - that you are still less likely to believe. And yet what I say is true, although a thing of which it is hard for me to persuade you. Moreover, I am not accustomed to think that I deserve any punishment. Had I money I might have proposed to give you what I had, and have been none the worse. But you see that I have none, and can only ask you to proportion the fine to my means. However, I think that I could afford a minae, and therefore I propose that penalty; Plato, Crito, Critobulus, and Apollodorus, my friends here, bid me say thirty minae, and they will be the sureties. Well then, say thirty minae, let that be the penalty; for that they will be ample security to you.


The jury condemns Socrates to death.

Socrates' Comments on his Sentence

Not much time will be gained, O Athenians, in return for the evil name which you will get from the detractors of the city, who will say that you killed Socrates, a wise man; for they will call me wise even although I am not wise when they want to reproach you. If you had waited a little while, your desire would have been fulfilled in the course of nature. For I am far advanced in years, as you may perceive, and not far from death. I am speaking now only to those of you who have condemned me to death. And I have another thing to say to them: You think that I was convicted through deficiency of words - I mean, that if I had thought fit to leave nothing undone, nothing unsaid, I might have gained an acquittal. Not so; the deficiency which led to my conviction was not of words - certainly not. But I had not the boldness or impudence or inclination to address you as you would have liked me to address you, weeping and wailing and lamenting, and saying and doing many things which you have been accustomed to hear from others, and which, as I say, are unworthy of me. But I thought that I ought not to do anything common or mean in the hour of danger: nor do I now repent of the manner of my defence, and I would rather die having spoken after my manner, than speak in your manner and live. For neither in war nor yet at law ought any man to use every way of escaping death. For often in battle there is no doubt that if a man will throw away his arms, and fall on his knees before his pursuers, he may escape death; and in other dangers there are other ways of escaping death, if a man is willing to say and do anything. The difficulty, my friends, is not in avoiding death, but in avoiding unrighteousness; for that runs faster than death. I am old and move slowly, and the slower runner has overtaken me, and my accusers are keen and quick, and the faster runner, who is unrighteousness, has overtaken them. And now I depart hence condemned by you to suffer the penalty of death, and they, too, go their ways condemned by the truth to suffer the penalty of villainy and wrong; and I must abide by my award - let them abide by theirs. I suppose that these things may be regarded as fated, - and I think that they are well.

And now, O men who have condemned me, I would fain prophesy to you; for I am about to die, and that is the hour in which men are gifted with prophetic power. And I prophesy to you who are my murderers, that immediately after my death punishment far heavier than you have inflicted on me will surely await you. Me you have killed because you wanted to escape the accuser, and not to give an account of your lives. But that will not be as you suppose: far otherwise. For I say that there will be more accusers of you than there are now; accusers whom hitherto I have restrained: and as they are younger they will be more severe with you, and you will be more offended at them. For if you think that by killing men you can avoid the accuser censuring your lives, you are mistaken; that is not a way of escape which is either possible or honorable; the easiest and noblest way is not to be crushing others, but to be improving yourselves. This is the prophecy which I utter before my departure, to the judges who have condemned me.

Friends, who would have acquitted me, I would like also to talk with you about this thing which has happened, while the magistrates are busy, and before I go to the place at which I must die. Stay then awhile, for we may as well talk with one another while there is time. You are my friends, and I should like to show you the meaning of this event which has happened to me. O my judges - for you I may truly call judges - I should like to tell you of a wonderful circumstance. Hitherto the familiar oracle within me has constantly been in the habit of opposing me even about trifles, if I was going to make a slip or error about anything; and now as you see there has come upon me that which may be thought, and is generally believed to be, the last and worst evil. But the oracle made no sign of opposition, either as I was leaving my house and going out in the morning, or when I was going up into this court, or while I was speaking, at anything which I was going to say; and yet I have often been stopped in the middle of a speech; but now in nothing I either said or did touching this matter has the oracle opposed me. What do I take to be the explanation of this? I will tell you. I regard this as a proof that what has happened to me is a good, and that those of us who think that death is an evil are in error. This is a great proof to me of what I am saying, for the customary sign would surely have opposed me had I been going to evil and not to good.

Let us reflect in another way, and we shall see that there is great reason to hope that death is a good, for one of two things: - either death is a state of nothingness and utter unconsciousness, or, as men say, there is a change and migration of the soul from this world to another. Now if you suppose that there is no consciousness, but a sleep like the sleep of him who is undisturbed even by the sight of dreams, death will be an unspeakable gain. For if a person were to select the night in which his sleep was undisturbed even by dreams, and were to compare with this the other days and nights of his life, and then were to tell us how many days and nights he had passed in the course of his life better and more pleasantly than this one, I think that any man, I will not say a private man, but even the great king, will not find many such days or nights, when compared with the others. Now if death is like this, I say that to die is gain; for eternity is then only a single night. But if death is the journey to another place, and there, as men say, all the dead are, what good, O my friends and judges, can be greater than this? If indeed when the pilgrim arrives in the world below, he is delivered from the professors of justice in this world, and finds the true judges who are said to give judgment there, Minos and Rhadamanthus and Aeacus and Triptolemus, and other sons of God who were righteous in their own life, that pilgrimage will be worth making. What would not a man give if he might converse with Orpheus and Musaeus and Hesiod and Homer? Nay, if this be true, let me die again and again. I, too, shall have a wonderful interest in a place where I can converse with Palamedes, and Ajax the son of Telamon, and other heroes of old, who have suffered death through an unjust judgment; and there will be no small pleasure, as I think, in comparing my own sufferings with theirs. Above all, I shall be able to continue my search into true and false knowledge; as in this world, so also in that; I shall find out who is wise, and who pretends to be wise, and is not. What would not a man give, O judges, to be able to examine the leader of the great Trojan expedition; or Odysseus or Sisyphus, or numberless others, men and women too! What infinite delight would there be in conversing with them and asking them questions! For in that world they do not put a man to death for this; certainly not. For besides being happier in that world than in this, they will be immortal, if what is said is true.

Wherefore, O judges, be of good cheer about death, and know this of a truth - that no evil can happen to a good man, either in life or after death. He and his are not neglected by the gods; nor has my own approaching end happened by mere chance. But I see clearly that to die and be released was better for me; and therefore the oracle gave no sign. For which reason also, I am not angry with my accusers, or my condemners; they have done me no harm, although neither of them meant to do me any good; and for this I may gently blame them.

Still I have a favor to ask of them. When my sons are grown up, I would ask you, O my friends, to punish them; and I would have you trouble them, as I have troubled you, if they seem to care about riches, or anything, more than about virtue; or if they pretend to be something when they are really nothing, - then reprove them, as I have reproved you, for not caring about that for which they ought to care, and thinking that they are something when they are really nothing. And if you do this, I and my sons will have received justice at your hands.

The hour of departure has arrived, and we go our ways - I to die, and you to live. Which is better God only knows.

The Sympathy (Reaction Paper On the Movie Sympathy for Lady Vengeance)

The Sympathy


What is Happiness?


Happiness is hard to be defined, because it is exhibited in different ways, in different degree, in different situations, by different people. We humans have also different definitions of happiness, it depends on our environment and our circumstances in life.


The movie Sympathy For Lady Vengeance gives us ideas on how happiness is defined.


Sympathy For Lady Vengeance starts with introducing Geum-ja(Lee-Young Ae) a woman which is convicted to prison in a crime she did not do. After 13 years in prison (in that 13 years the prisoners called her as Kind-hearted Geum-ja), she organized a plan to kill a certain Mr. Baek, which according to the flashbacks, is the perpetrator and executioner of the crime Geum-ja suppose has done. In the movie we also watched the reunion of Geum-ja with her daughter, Jenny. The movie ends with the plan executed.
The movie shows different kinds of happiness and how it is exhibited.


Geum-ja


Geum-ja the protagonist is kind of a woman that for 13 years have been devoid of happiness which is freedom, after her serving time she finds happiness in retribution for the sins her fellow humans have committed against her. Geum-ja exhibited many kinds of happiness, the happiness of freedom after 13 years of imprisonment, the happiness with reuniting with her daughter, and the happiness with retribution. Geum-ja was happy when she was free, because she could execute the plan to kill Mr. Baek and be reunited with her daughter. Geum-ja, was happy when reunited with her daughter ( though it is not clearly evident) because it is the time to put back the time lost in showing her love for her daughter. Geum-ja is definitely happy when killing Mr. Baek , though in the movie her conscience seems to bother her, because it removes another thorn in her flesh.


Mr. Baek
Mr. Baek the antagonist was also exhibiting some kinds of happiness. In doing the crime he has done, he was surely happy, because if he is not he would have stop. He was happy in abusing Geum-ja (when she was still young) and his wife (which eventually drugged him).


Mr. Baek's Wife
Mr. Baek's wife finds happiness also in retribution on what her husband has done to her.

Jenny
Jenny exhibited also happiness when reunited with her mother as evident by her wanting to go back with her mother to Korea.

The Inmates
The inmates wee also happy, because of the help Geum-ja has given and, for helping Geum-ja.

The Victim's Relatives
Happiness is also exhibited by the relatives of Mr. Baek's victims, in killing Mr. Baek for vengeance.

The Detective
The Detective has shown happiness in helping Geum-ja and the victim's relative in killing Mr. Baek.




What is Happiness?
Happiness as shown by the characters can be equated to satisfaction. We observed in the movie that the characters are happy because the are satisfied. Happiness is not always doing good but it is more on satisfaction. The movie espouses that we can find happiness in things that satisfies us.

Oedipus Rex (A Reaction Paper)

Humanities1-Y2

October 10, 2006

2006-14269

Oedipus Rex

(A Reaction Paper)

A man who blinded himself and ran off from his city, Oedipus, a man whose identity he himself did not know. He killed his father and married his mother, unknowingly fulfilling a prophecy. This is a story of a man written by Greek Tragedian Sophocles and presented by Professor Elmer Rufo at the University of the Philippines Los Banos from September 14, 2006 to September 15, 2006.

The play starts with the presenting of what is happening to Oedipus’ beloved city, Thebes . Oedipus consoled his people; Creon (Oedipus’ brother-in-law) told them that the solution is finding the murderer of the late king Laius, former king of Thebes . In investigating the murder, Oedipus learned about himself and the crime he have done. Queen Locaste (Oedipus’ mother and later wife) killed herself in anguish and Oedipus blinded himself, got away from Thebes and lived in exile.

While reading or watching Oedipus Rex, people may be wondered, amazed or somewhat puzzled. Oedipus Rex as written by Sophocles is an intricate and hard to be understood play. Sophocles may live long ago, write long ago, and think differently compared to us, but his play has traverse time, surviving years and withstood many criticisms. In the time of Sophocles, people in his particular place think that gods ruled them and they (the people) were only toys played by the gods, in other words, gods are superior to man. The Oedipus Rex acknowledge the supremacy of the gods, by showing, that defiance to the divine may brought afflictions; like in the case of King Laius and Queen Locaste, they liked to defy the divine prophecy, that their son would kill his father and marry his mother, by commanding their servant to left the child to a mountain; Oedipus also want to defy the divine by running away from his known parents so that the prophecy may not be fulfilled. The supremacy of the gods was shown in the fulfillment of the divine prophecy.

The concept of fate was shown in Oedipus Rex; fate is irrevocable and cannot be changed. Wisdom in suffering was also shown, like when Oedipus exiled himself from Thebes because it is good for him and because that was what he laid before him. Humility was also shown in the play; the lack of humility of Oedipus brought him his downfall. In Oedipus Rex we see the conflict between free will and determinism. The story concluded that what is determined will always happen.

The concept of guilt was also raised in Oedipus Rex; guilt is not based in intention but based on its result. Morality was also raised in connection with guilt. It told us that what is moral is not also based on what-you-know but is based on what-had-happened.

Reading Oedipus Rex is boring, because it does not contain much action but it seems to be a collection of debates, speeches and orations. Reading Oedipus Rex Raise many questions like: What is the main problem? Is it the identity of Oedipus? Is it the murder of ones father? Or is it the marrying of ones mother? We were not introduce with the real problem but we were continually surprised by the progress we were not given even a hint about the problem.

The end is also problematic, would Oedipus’ exile will answer the problem, and will it absolve him of his suppose sin. The concept of guilt raised but it’s not sufficient, we were not introduce to sin but was not told what sin is, we were told only that this is wrong and this is right, but the whole concept being introduce is not concrete. We were introduce to fate but as the story progresses we were told that we can escape fate but fate is also irrevocable, the story is paradoxical because of the concept of fate. We were told of the supremacy of the gods we were told of their hardheartedness, their seemingly being unfair in their relationship with humans, we were told that what gods say will always happen but they seem to be only prophesying and were not capable in driving human affairs.

In Oedipus Rex we were told of a Greek myth, I think it’s not appropriate to accredit the ideas of Oedipus Rex to Sophocles only because he is only writing a common story in his time and not supplanting it with anything, Sophocles was just writing a myth and the ideas did not come from him but were dictated by the society where he belong.

Oedipus rex as presented by Elmer Rufo in the University of the Philippines Los Banos, did not look like what the ancient Greeks watch in their auditoriums but look liked more on as a half-cook Elizabethan play. The lighting and the props were just right, the problem is the people in the play, some seems to be first-timers because the words they say are not clear and they say it in some funny way, some scenes in the play was not clearly spoken.

Oedipus Rex to Things Fall Apart

Oedipus rex and Things Fall Apart show some parallelism. The story of Oedipus was like the story of Okonkwo. They were both strong in the beginning and fall in the end. Oedipus was mighty like Okonkwo, because they were on the peak of their gloriousness in the beginning. The crisis in Oedipus Rex began to show itself when Oedipus was investigating the death of King Laius only on the middle like when Okonkwo was exiled. Okonkwo and Oedipus tried to overcome their problem, when Oedipus tried to reason with his full might that he was not the one who killed the late King, and when Okonkwo would like to terminate the Christians, but were unsuccessful and were drove by reality to their downfall. Reality is what Oedipus and Okonkwo did not understand they were both idealistic and believe that they were still mighty. In the end, Okonkwo killed himself and Oedipus blinded and exiled himself because they can’t accept reality. Things Fall Apart and Oedipus Rex run on the same way like all what Greek Tragedies, the downfall of a mighty man.

Impressionism:Revolt against Tradition

Impressionism:

Revolt against Tradition

In Europe the 19^th century was an age of radical change, in which the modern world was shaped, Revolution after revolution, interrupted by counter-revolutions and reactions from the conservatives. European influence extended virtually at the ends of the earth, the formations of empires was supported by nationalism at home. The industrial revolution and the bourgeoisie (middle class) were against the impoverished masses because of economic and social struggle. The industrial revolution brought thousands to the city and sent thousands abroad, because of that there is a wide inequality between the rich and the poor. There is a liberal belief in progress that human history can be changed by thought and action, as long as people are not hindered by the higher authority. Humanity was thought, can be perfected and there is an advocacy calling for a greatest good for a greatest number in the government, in law and economy. Confusion arose over the means to do this things, this confusion brought a wide range of ideologies, this ideologies which agitated the 19^th century and remain current today are the –isms; liberalism, radicalism, socialism, communism, conservatism and nationalism. Their counterpart in the art world is the romanticism, realism, impressionism and the rest. The ideologies were dissatisfied with the status quo which

the past lingered. In arts, it means debate over the relative values of the traditional and the modern. The 19^th century artist had to face formidable changes in all sides. The church and the secular nobility were replaced by the triumphant middle class, the national states and national academies as sources of an artist commissions. Rejecting the authority of the prevailing taste and of the institutions backing it, these artists claimed the right to an authority of their own, they restore or recreate art (Delacroix, H., Tansey, R., & Kirkpatrick, P., 1991).

Romanticism

The traditional antagonist of Neoclassicism, pictures showing qualities opposed to the formalism, clear color, rigid composition, republicanism and collectible morality of Davidian art (Myers, B., 1959). Romanticism was a movement with a relatively wide range of subject matter which offered more thematic possibilities than Neoclassicism, its origin are found in the 18^th century especially in the work of Jean-Jacques Rousseau. In contrast with neoclassical virtues of order and clarity, Romantics believed in emotional expression and sentiment. Instead of encouraging heroism in behalf of an abstract idea, in neoclassical manner, the Romantics were partisan supporter of contemporary causes, such as individual struggle against the state. Romantics developed an interest in the mind as the site of mysterious, unexplained and possibly dangerous phenomena’s, dreams and nightmares depicted as internal events with their source in the individual, rather than as external, supernatural happenings (Adams, L., 1994). In the 19^th century, Romanticism continued to center around concerns for the abolition of traditions, institutions, and privileges that were seem to have impeded human progress. Romanticism inherited the Enlightenment’s admiration of nature and the natural over convention and artifice. The emphasis on human rights in the public sphere was accompanied by the assertion of the value of feeling and emotion in private experience. Truth could be sought and found inwardly; the intensity of religious and mystical emotions associated with traditional Christianity could live on in individual with or without preference to specific creeds. On issues of the day, Romantics were on the opposing sides-progressive and conservative, democratic and monarchistic, religious and agnostic, hoping and despairing, satanic and angelic (Delacroix, H., Tansey, R., & Kirkpatrick, P., 1991). The classical and the medieval interest the Romantics, the important characteristics of Romanticism are found in emphasis of the irregular over the regular, the picturesque over the formal, the vague over the clear and the exotic over the rational. The Romantics were interested in two things: first his own emotions and thus the particular fragment of reality which caused the emotion (Myers, B., 1959). Romantic artist held the views that imagination and emotion are more valuable than reason; nature is more corrupt than civilization (Preble, D., & Preble, S., 1994). The relationship between man and nature have been one of the main subject of the Romantic movement, the smallness of the individual before the majesty of nature is a purely Romantic phenomena, man became a merely part of the universe and not a yardstick by which it is measured, this has been a negation of the supposedly increased consequence of man in post-feudal society (Myers, B., 1959). Both Neoclassicism and Romanticism had their beginnings in rebellion but the later become institutionalized, functioning instead as a conservative force in France’s artistic life (Preble, D., & Preble, S., 1994).

Realism

The miserable state of the peasantry and also the suffering of the new working class and the lower middle-class during the confusion of the first half of the century formed a background for the painting of Millet, Courbet and Daumier. They were under the Realistic banner, although profoundly stirred by the everyday world, are not only Romantic in feeling but directly stem from the tradition. The romantic painter was interested in his own emotions and then the particular fragment of reality which caused the emotion. The Realist reacted against the Romantics, insisted that the recording of this reality must be objective and plausible. The Realistic movement in art is neither widespread nor extreme. Although these men were all labeled “socialist” for their subjects they paint each represented a different level of social and political thinking. Millet was uninterested in politics and conservative in outlook. Courbet did not seem to understand too well the ideological basis of his actions. Daumier was the great and conscious social critic in the group. Their work represents the victory of the artist’s right to paint what he likes (Myers, B., 1959). Technically, realism deals with the replication of an optical field achieved by matching its color tones on a flat surface, whether or not the subject matter has or could have been seen by the artist. Iconographically, 19^th century realism can be described as seen or seeable by the artist. Realists disapproved traditional and fictional subjects on the grounds that there were not real or visible and were not of the present world. The realist vision and method resulted in a modern style one by definition went off from the past. The realist position in art was strengthened by the scientific and technological achievements of the 19^th century, proponents of scientific positivism asserted that only scientifically verified facts are real. The realism of Manet (which became the realism of the Impressionist), revealed a striking paradox in realism, to capture the entire optical field, artists must paint it just as they see it. However, painter must work swiftly in a sketch like execution that blurs the visual field as it increasingly emphasized the brush strokes and the blot of colors. The wholeness of the field disintegrates into a plurality of color functions. Scientists would say that these artists are not painting the world but only individual sensations of it sought so avidly was really determined by their own inescapable subjectivity. Real events were becoming subjects for artists who are willing to report or reconstruct seems in visual modes faithful to appearance, these artists produced images that invited comparison for everyday optical experience in life using simple recognition as a new criterion for judgment. Realism is the style of art that depicts ordinary circumstances without idealism, exoticism or nostalgia; Realist believed that art should deal with human experience and observation (Delacroix, H., Tansey, R., & Kirkpatrick, P., 1991).

Impressionism

Attacks on artist by an outraged public were a regular feature of the mid-19^th century life. In 1863 a Salon was opened for rejected works of the official Salon, this Salon is called Salon des Refuses (Honour, H., & Fleming, J., 1986). In 1874 a group of young painter who had been denied the right to show in the official Salon of 1873 organized an independent exhibition of their work, they opposed academic doctrines and Romantic ideals, and they turned to the portrayal of ordinary life. Landscape and ordinary scenes painted outdoors in varied atmospheric conditions or seasons, and times of day were among their main subject.

They learned that light is seen as a complex reflection received by the eye and reassemble by the mind during the process of perception (Preble, D., & Preble, S., 1994). The Impressionist painters despised surface finish and had boldly exposed the anatomy of the work (Reitlinger, G., 1965).The general public accustomed to the smooth brushwork and careful finish had some difficulty in reading Impressionist paintings which looks like casual sketches (Honour, H., & Fleming, J., 1986). The name Impressionism itself was a mere accident, the chance remark a critic who, somewhat puzzled by a picture of Claude Monet, Impression: soleil levant, had used the word to describe the entire group of painters exhibiting their work at the same time (Van Loon, H., 1994).The Impressionist never completely won over the official art-world but was recognized by the cultivated individuals. They convey, the impressionist paintings, a quintessentially middle class vision of happiness, carefree and extrovert, no paintings had ever before shown such innocent unquestioning joy in the visible world. The impressionist painters believed that painters should deal only with the world around him. Landscapes or other out-of-doors subject are painted largely or entirely on the spot and not in studio. Urban nightlife and the anonymous vitality of the streets and Cafes, bar and cabarets appealed to the impressionist and the recognition of its visual for the painter is their greatest discovery (Honour, H., & Fleming, J., 1986). The Impressionist was perfecting a middle-class art, glorifying life in the big city and portraying the various aspects of nature outside the city, impressionism represents the full flower of urban art. Not only does it gives us the subject matter of the big city but represents it in a newer and most nervous manner (Myers, B., 1959). Unlike Realism, Impressionism responded rarely, if ever to political events. The impressionist were also concerned with direct observation-especially of the natural properties of light. They studied changes in light and color caused by weather conditions, times of the day and season. Reflection and shadows become the important subjects. Impressionist painters formed a distinct community; they liked to exchange ideas in more Bohemian surroundings notably the Café Guerbois in Paris. They had eight exhibitions of their work between 1847 to 1886. Despite the contemporary rejection of Impressionism it had a greater international impact in the long run than previous styles that had been readily accepted in France (Adams, L., 1994).

Manet and Impressionism

It was with Eduoard Manet (1832-1883) that the course of modern printing shifted into a new-phase, in addition to accurately recording the appearance of the physical world, it had its aim the authentic representation of color and light that reveals the world to the eye. Although the term Impressionism was coined in 1874, the battle began eleven years ago with Manet’s Luncheon in the Grass.

Manet exhibited this painting at the Salon des Refuses in Paris, the exhibit consist of a large number of works rejected by the jury of the major Academy Salon that year. Ironically it was a public seeking the avant-garde at the Salon des Refuses that was shocked by Manet’s Luncheon in the Grass originally titled simply The Bath. In the Luncheon in the Grass, Manet does not attempt to revive to revive great paintings, but tries to speak in a new voice with an authority equal to that of his celebrated “predecessors”. Nothing was heroic on the foreground, the figures were identifiable persons. The seated nude was Manet’s favorite model and the gentlemen were his brother and the sculptor Ferdinand Leenof (Delacroix, H., Tansey, R., & Kirkpatrick, P., 1991). In contrast with the earlier artist work gradually from a dark background to the highlights when necessary, Manet on the other hand, like in the Luncheon in the Grass, painted on the light areas into which half-light and darker tones was worked while light portions were still wet, in this way he could convey the feeling of a surface charged with light. Although composed of the conventional Renaissance triangle, the work violated all accepted canons of subject matter, the casual attitude of the nude was an offense to the public while the idea of eating food in this circumstances makes the situation worse. The picture is interesting as an illustration of Manet’s flat technique, the silhouetted figure of the nude emerging against the stark blackness of the young mans coat (Myers, B., 1959). In the Luncheon in the grass, Manet raised the veils of allusion and reverie and bluntly confronted the public with reality. Manet’s another masterpiece, A Bar at the Folies-Bergere was painted in 1882.This work shows both an impersonality toward the subject and Manet’s fascination with the effects of light spilling from the glass globes into the figures and the objects around them. The barmaid in Manet’s painting is primarily a compositional device automatic and non-personal. The Folies-Bergere, illustrates another quality that first made its appearance in Luncheon in the Grass and was to loom with increasing importance in the works of later painters. Manet made a radical break with tradition by defining the function of the picture surface. Ever since, the picture was conceived as a “window” which the viewer look at an illusory space, Manet force the viewer to recognize it as a flatplane covered with patches of pigments. Throughout his career, Manet suffered hostility from the critic but he still continued to seek their approval, but the doses of the real he administered in his art were to harsh.

After the mid-1860’s, Impressionist painters such as Monet, Pissarro, Renoir and Degas followed Manet’s lead in depicting since of contemporary middle class Parisian life and landscape. Their desire for a more modern expression persuaded them to work out of doors. Most of the Impressionist exhibitions held between 1874 and 1886 irritated the public but the techniques they use was less radical than it seemed at the time, they were simply developing the color theories of Leonardo da Vinci and actual practice of their predecessors. The Impressionist sought to create the illusion of forms but in light and atmosphere. This goal required an intensive study of outdoor light, the actual color of an object is usually modified by the quality of the light in which it is seen by reflections from other objects. Shadows do not appear grey or black as many early painters thought but seem to be composed of colors modified by reflections or other conditions. The juxtaposition of colors on a canvass for they eye to fuse at a distance produce a more intense hue than mixing them on the palette. Although it is not strictly true that Impressionist use only primary hues, juxtaposing them to create secondary colors they achieve remarkably brilliant effects with their characteristically short choppy brush strokes, which so accurately caught the vibrating quality of light. The fact that the surfaces of their canvasses look unintelligible at closer range and their forms and objects appear only when the eye fuses the strokes at a certain distance (Delacroix, H., Tansey, R., & Kirkpatrick, P., 1991).

Monet

Claude Monet (1840-1926) carried the color method furthest, he called color his “day-long obsession, joy and torment”. When he looked at scenes such as those found in his Cliff at Etretat, he responded to lighting and atmospheric conditions in terms of color which he applied with thick dubbing strokes caused the surface to shimmer.Monet, with a scientific precision, created an unparalleled and unexcelled record of the passing of time as seen in the movement of light over identical forms (Delacroix, H., Tansey, R., & Kirkpatrick, P., 1991). Claude Monet is the leading landscapist in Impressionism. In 1866, he began to use spots of clear color as well as complementary and unmixed tones. Although there are still people who consider Monet’s painting as scientific, this is an exaggeration in spite of the logic in color relationship and the search for transitory effects, the total effects of his landscape is gently lyrical. Monet subscribed the idea that a picture must give an accidental quality (Myers, B., 1959).

Pissarro

Camille Pissarro, like Monet sought to depict the fugitive effects of light at the particular moment, but the moment at Pissarro’s, Place du Theatre (Figure 5) is not much one of light itself as of the life of the street, achieved through a deliberate casualness in the arrangement of his figures that is related to that in early photographs of street scenes. In a letter Pissarro spoke of the Impressionist belief that what was real in nature was the light and color stimuli it revealed to the analytic eye of the modern painter (Delacroix, H., Tansey, R., & Kirkpatrick, P., 1991). The work of Camille Pissarro as more diversified that of Monet, both in the variety of media he practiced and in treatment and subject matter. Pissarro is one of the few open air painter. In landscape painting, his work is individual and distinguishable from the others. In L’ Isle Lacroix, Rouen, this slightly atmospheric picture enjoys all of the color qualities of plein–air painting. The difference between Pissarro and Monet is found in the relative solidity of the former’s work even in landscape (Myers, B., 1959).

Renoir

Auguste Renoir (1841-1919), was a specialist in the human figure, an admirer in what is beautiful and pleasurable in the simple human life. His painting Le Moulin de la Galette shows the celebration of vicious charm. It shows not like us with the tradition, that we are observing a performance, but we are part of it.

The subjects are unconscious of the observer they merely go about their business. Classical art sought to express universal and timeless qualities but Impressionism depict the incidental momentary aspect of reality (Delacroix, H., Tansey, R., & Kirkpatrick, P., 1991). His painting The Loge marked a serious advance over and earlier and more typical Impressionist efforts.

The two figures on the box here begin to show Renoir’s personal approach toward monumentability and permanence achieved through expressive colors. In Moulin de la Galette, the quite youthful joyousness is more strongly felt. The foreground is built up by a group of figures obliquely arranged and cut off at the side and bottom, although the subject prescribes moment, there is a quite suspended quality in the scene (Myers, B., 1959).

Degas

Edgar Degas (1834-1917) though sympathetic to the Impressionist, he was independent. Degas studied the infinite variety of movements and the kinesthetic qualities of bodies and motion. His Ballet Rehearsal (Adagio) Degas bring the observer into the pictorial space, the figures are accidental in arrangement and a large continuous empty space produce an illusion that we are on the scene.The cunning special projection in Ballet Rehearsal not only came from the interest of the artist in photography but inspired by 18^th century Japanese woodblock prince in which line functions as lines directing the observer to the picture. Viscount Lepic and his Daughters summarize what the artist learned from photograph and Japanese print.

The clear flat pattern, the unusual viewpoint and the informal glimpse of contemporary life. Degas’ designs do not cling to the canvass as Monet’s and Manet’s but they take the viewer behind the picture plane (Delacroix, H., Tansey, R., & Kirkpatrick, P., 1991).

Cassat

Mary Cassat (1845-1926) was an American artist which was befriended and influenced by Degas and exhibit with the Impressionist. Because of many restriction, Cassat subject were primarily women and children. Her work like The Bath shows the relationship of the mother to her child.

Color binds mother, child and wash basins into one central form. Cassat’s style owed to Degas and of Japanese print but the design has originality and strength of his own (Delacroix, H., Tansey, R., & Kirkpatrick, P., 1991).

Whistler

James Abbott McNeill Whistler (1839-1903) was an American who worked on the continent before settling in London. He shared the Impressionist’s interest in the contemporary life and sensations produced by color. To underscore his artistic intentions, Whistler called his paintings as “arrangements” or “nocturnes”, such as the

Nocturne in Blue and Gold (Old Battersea Bridge).

The painting was a composition in which evening light simplifies shapes in hazy silhouettes. Blue tones fill the canvass relieved only by touches of yellow and red indicating shore lights and effects of the setting sun as the heavy clouds in the sky. In the Nocturne, Whistler has taken “Impression” of what our eyes sees in nature further than any of the Impressionist (Delacroix, H., Tansey, R., & Kirkpatrick, P., 1991).

Post Impressionism

By 1886, the Impressionist were accepted as serious artists by most critics and by inner segment of the public. However, some of the painters themselves and a group of younger followers came to feel that too many traditional elements of picture making were being neglected in search for momentary sensations of light and color (Delacroix, H., Tansey, R., & Kirkpatrick, P., 1991). Although their styles are quite diverse, they are united by the fact that nearly all were influenced in one way or another by the Impressionist style. Like Impressionist, they were drawn to bright colors and visible distinctive strokes, despite that prominent stroke their forms do not dissolve into the medium as quickly as Impressionist (Adams, l., 1994).

Sources:

Preble, D., & Preble, S.,(1994) Artforms,an introduction to the visual art.(5^th ed.). Harper Collins College Publisher

VanLoon, H. (1944) The arts. New York: Sinion &Schuster

Myers, B. (1959). Modern art in the making. United States of America: McGraw-Hill book Company

Reitlinger, G.(1965). The economics of taste. United States of America: Holt, Rinehart and Winston

Honuor, H., & Fleming, J.(1986). The visual arts. New Jersey: Prentice-Hall

Adams, L.(1994). A history of western art. Brown & Benchmark

DelaCroix, H., Tansey, R., & Kirkpatrick, d.,(1991). Art through the ages. (19^th ed.). United States of America: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich